A National Security Talk Between Two Colleagues

By Cristina C. Giancchini & SC

Last month I was having an interesting conversation with a colleague (hereby designated SC, as in Silent Contributor) about the recent London Terrorist Attacks, and why it is so difficult for the political echelon to coordinate with the security establishment. Most of our conversation is not for public consumption, notwithstanding there is a section of it that I think is very enlightening and therefore should be shared with our readers. That part of our interaction went as follows:

Giancchini:  I just wonder what other evidence do Europeans need that whenever Abbas talks, a Jihadi cell is triggered somewhere else? DS has warned about this time and time again.

SC: I am not sure.  Once again, no one is taking Abbas and the PLO (sorry PLA) seriously. This is the challenge.

Giancchini: And do you think they are handling ISIS operations in Europe properly?

SC: Well, they are not taking the fact that IS has several former Iraqi National Guard members who are very well trained soldiers seriously either. When you consider their Modus Operandi (MO), they are very similar to military and guerrilla warfare tactics that they constantly modify and adopt to achieve their objectives.

Giancchini: Copy that. So what should we retain from this week's activities?

SC: In the UK, as soon as the Army was removed from the streets, they (IS) attacked, they attacked in Afghanistan, Cameroon (BK) and they continue their atrocities in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. In France, they have managed to evade the heavy security presence and in the Philippines, they are engaging the Marines.

Giancchini: Good point.

SC: Besides, we have four models to consider :

1. The UK approach (Police, Special Police Units, Army Units and the SAS)
2. The French approach (Police, Army, Special Police Units and the SF)
3. The Coalition approach in Syria and Iraq (use of drones, aircraft, ground forces, special forces and naval missiles)
4. The supply of arms, ammunition, training and intelligence to local militia and military forces in Syria and Iraq.

The most successful approach have been with the use of Specially trained units (Police and Military and a combination of).  This is also based on the success of the Israeli model.

Giancchini: What, in your opinion, should we be doing then?

SC: We have to take this one step further, we have to re-train all units to these levels and change legislation and laws to allow Law Enforcement and the Military and Intelligence to work and train together. If we can achieve this, then we have a better chance against IS and AQ (and whoever else).  If we can adopt this, then we can set a standard.

Giancchini: Anything in particular we have to look at?

SC: Yep. We have to look at Intelligence Gathering:

• How is this done?  
• Is there a standard? 
• Is there some common ground? 
• How is the analysis done? 
• Is there a standard for this?  
• Is there common ground? 
• How much of this Intelligence is Human Intelligence? 

This is where I believe we have a weak spot, as we are still heavily reliant on technology. The Israeli system while it incorporates technology, and all its gadgets, it remains very reliant on human intelligence and they have a good success rate.  If the EU and Western units can realise this, then they can begin to have successful operations. This is a model that can set a standard.

Giancchini: Roger that. What else should we be doing?

SC: Ah, we should recognise that there must be a proper response to Terrorist Attacks.

Giancchini: I think we all do, including politicians. I sense their problem is how to set up that proper response without hurting their political position. Most of the times, National Security matters can either be a King Maker or a Deal Breaker - especially if the Government fails to translate events to the Public.

SC: Take the last attack in the UK, for instance, the Police responded in eight minutes and the emergency services followed. It was a team approach and they had a plan. They also had mobile armed teams on duty round the clock in unmarked and marked vehicles and the large undercover force (some of these units could be SAS). They also learned to control information that was shared with the media on the terrorists and the attack until they conducted their investigations. This is a model that can set a standard for preparedness too.

Giancchini: Yeah, and yet it still managed to hurt PM Theresa May, because as effective as the security forces may have been, somehow the PM failed to explain in simple language what was going on and exactly what she meant to do ("Enough is Enough" was not convincing enough), and that failure showed in the electoral results.

(Image: Caffè de Ville - Victor Ostrovsky)

[The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dissecting Society]